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STATE OF THE ECONOMY:
CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA PERSPECTIVE*
rapid growth in CBN credit for

T"

importance of our deliberations atthis two'day Pre1994 Budget Workshop can-

the financing of

not be over-emphasised as the
cross-fertilisation of ideas that
will take place, especially at
the discussion groups, will no

monetary aggr egates. The negative effects of this development
include intens ified pressures on
domestic prices, the naira exchange rate, andthe balance of

doubt affect the quality of inputstothe 1994 budget, andof
course its outcome. The theme
of my presentation is ttre State
of the Economy from the perspective of the Central Bank of
Nigeria. I will, in the process
review broadly recent developments in the real, monetary
and financial and external sectors of the economy, highlight

the problems confronting
policy makers and put forward

some reco[lmcndations for
consideration
The overall performance of
the Nigerian economy during
the past thnee years has been

characterized by declining
growth rate of GDP in turn a
reflection, in the main, of the
negative impact of the
rulcroeconomic and financial
imbalances. The major factor
rmderlying the adverse movements in macroeconomic variables since l99l has been the
*An

s

on November

2

\--

Federal
Government's fiscal deficit resulting in excessive growth in

payments. Other major prob
lems include large externalpayments, low output growth and
tnrstab le soc io-political environment.

1. Developments in the
Real Sector
Domestic Product (GDP)
at 1 9M constant factorcost grew
at4.5 and 4.1 per cent in l99l
and 1992, respectively and is
projected to grow at not more
thzn 2.5% in 1993. This is
against 8.3 per cent achieved in
I 990. The index of agricultural
production which increased by
4.9 and 4.5 per cent in l99l and
1992, respectively declined by
0.3 per cent in the first half of
1993. hradequate supply of farm
inputs and unfavourable weather
conditions largely accorurted for
the declining trend in agricr:ltural production.
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Industrial production als o declined by 1.3 per cent in the
first half of t 9 93 compared with
a modest increase of l.l per
cent in the corresponding pe-

riod of last year. Although
manufachring production grew
by 4.2 per cent, it was, however, inadequate to offset the
decline that occurred in the
mining and electricity consumption sub-sectors. At ttre
end of Jure 1993, the rate of
capacity utilisation was 37.0
per cent, compared with the 8.7
per cent recorded in the first
half of 1992. The inflationary
pressures observed since I99l
remained unabated. The rate of
inflation which rose from
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13.0 per cent

in lggl to M.6

per cent n 1992, furttrer increased to 54.2 per cent at the
endofthe firsthalfof 1993 and
it is currently projected to rise
to 60. 0 per cent at the end ofthe
year. All the major components of the consumer price
index contributed to the increase in the price level.
National registered unem-

money supply narrowly defined ary expectation. The average
i.e., M, increased by 32.6 and savings deposit rate rose to
66.4 per cent in 1991 and 1992 I 9.4 per cent in June 1993 from
respectively compared with the 16.1 per cent in December
maximum targets of 14.6 and 1992. Similarly, the average
24.3 per cent. In the first half of prime lending rate increased
1993, M, grew by 8.5 per cent. from 29.8 per cent in Decem-

Broad money or M, also in- ber 1992 to 39.2 per cent in
creased by 24.0 per cent com- June while ttre maximumlendpared with 20.0 per cent in the ing rate rose from 31 .2 per cent
filst half of 1992. The major to 44.3 per cent during the
ployment rate also increased to factor contributing to the in- same period. However, as a
4. 0 per cent during the fint half creases in monetary aggregates result of the prevailing inflaof I 993 from 3.2 per cent in the was aggregate credit to the tion, real interest mtes rernained
same period of last year. The economy. At the end of June negative. The average intersectoral breakdown showed 1993, aggregate banking bank rate hit an all -time high
that unemployment worsened system's credit to the economy of 106.0 per cent in tlre first
among primary and post sec- increasedby 3 I .4 billion or2 I . 6 week of June before deceleratondary school leavers. There per cent following the increase ing to 92.0 pr cent at the end
was also the worsening of in- of 45.3 per,cent in 1991 and of the month. The high interdustrial relations during the pe- 73.6 per cent in 1992. The bank rate was, of course, atriod Although the number of observed expansion in aggre- tributable partly to borrowings
strikes recorded dropped to29 gate credit was due largely to made by some banks to enable
from 69 in the corresponding the rapid increases in credit to them participate in the foreign
period of 1992, the number of the Federal Govemment which exchange market and partly to
workers involved in the strikes accounted for 77 .3 and 5 8.9 per deals by dishessed banks to
increased by 401.6 per cent cent of total credit to the keep them in business.
The distress in the furancial
while the rnan-days lost rose economy n 1992 and the first
significantly by 2,338.5 per half of 1993, respectively. Net system persisted during the
cent. The strikes adversely af- claims on govemment during first half of 1993. Findings
fected the social services, es- the first half of 1993 at 104.2 from routine examination carpecially health and educational billion, represented an increase ried out on a mrmber of finanof 18.0 billion or 20.9 per cent. cial institutions revealed the
systems.
Again, this followed unprec- persistence of management
2. Monetary and Financial edented increases of 82.9 per cris es ; poor intemal conhol and
cent in 1991 and 123.9 per cent liquidity position and underDevelopments

n

Monetary aggregates have
grown phenomenally since
throughJune 1993 in contzst with the stated restrictive
stance ofmonetary policy during the period. For instance,
199
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1992.
With regard to interest rates,
the upward trend persisted duringthe firsthalf of 1993,largely
as a result ofthe banks' aggressive drive for new deposits
coupled with the high inflation-

capitalisation among the deficiencies in the operations of
the financial institutions. The
number of distressed banks
stood at 76 while 5 licensed
fuiance houses were also identif,red as technically insolvent

at the end of Jrme 1993.

emment expenditure and the

prospects are that debt service
payments would be higher in
the second half of 1993, as a
result of higher domestic interThe fiscal operations of the est rates on govenrment securiFederal Govemment resulted ties and the under-provis ioning
in an overall deficit of 27.1 for external debt payments in
billion during the first half of the 1993 budget.

3. Government Fiscal
Operations

1993 as against 15.7 billion
dtuing the corresponding period of 1992 and a target of
28.6 billion for the whole of
1993. The budgetary gap was
met largely from CentralBank
financing with all the attendant
problems of macroeconomic
instability uzually associated
withthis tlpe of financing. For
example, financing of the huge
overall fiscal deficits through
Central Bank credit to govemment has exacerbated the
growth of money supply and
inflation and was the most po
tent single contributory factor
to the naira exchange rate instability.
The major problems in the
fiscal operations ofthe Federal
Govemment are largely attrib
uted to the slower growttr in
retained revenue, the inability
to reduce the rate of growttr of
total expenditue, persistence
of substantial extra budgetary
outlays and large debt service
obligations. The debt service
br.uden is particularly worri-

4.

Developments in the
External Sector

The pressure on the external
sector also remained unabated
dnring the fust half of 1993,
largely as aresult of the decline
in foreign exchange earnings,
the huge external debt service
payments, andthe spill - overof
the effects of excessive domestic credit. The balance of payments indicated an overall surplus of $485.5 million during
the fint half of 1993 as against

a deficit of $1,004.6 million
during ttre corresponding period of last year. This was dne
largely to the curent account
surplus which rose to $1.7
billion from $1.4 billion in the
fust half of 1993 and the decline in capital account deficit
from $2.3 billion to Sl.l billion. The lowerlevel ofcapital
account deficit was, however,
due to the deferred payment
of scheduled amortisation fall-

ing due during the period.
some . For instance, during the
The excruciating debt service
fust half of 1993, debt service burden persisted. At the end
payments accoturted for 42.8 of September 1993, total
debt

per cent
4

oftotal Federal gov- service payments stood

at

$1.2 billion absorbing about
26 per cent of the estimated
foreign exchange earnings.
Between January and September, I 993, an estimated amount
of $ 1.2 billiondue forpayment
couldnot be paid bringing the
stock of external debt at the
end of September, 1993 to an
estimated $28.6 billion, about
&Wr cent of whichwas owed
to the Paris Club group of
creditors.
Thenaira exctrange rate also
remained uurder pressure.
Although the rate in the official segment of the foreign
exchange market has been
relatively stable, the rates in
the bureaux de changeandparallel market have depreci-

ated persistently reflecting
amongother things, the effect
of excessive liquidity caused
by huge budget deficit and
inadequate supply of foreign
exchange relative to demand.
Other factors included speculative activities of the operators arrticipating a devaluation
of the naim sxstrange rate,

political instability as well

as

defective allocation or bidding

mechanism adopted As a
result, the gap between the
official and parallel market
as well as the bureaux de
ctrange rates has widened
significantly from about 19

per cent in the first seven
months of 1992 to above 90
per cent at the end of
October, 1993.

5. The Msin Problem

enemy. As such,

it

requires
immediate and decisive action.
The core problem facing policy lmmediate steps should theremakers in the cormtry today is fore be taken to reduce the size
the prevailing instability in key of the budget deficit to sustainrnacroeconomic variables - bud- able level ofabout 5 p"r cent of
get defrcit, money supply, infla- GDP.
(ii) While it is necessary to
tion and exchange rate - all of
which hinge very cnrcially on reduce budget deficits through
the ever-widening budget defi- nevenue entrancement and excit which nolr/ appears to as- penditure retrenchment, gains
sume a structural dimension. A can also be made by raising
major goal of the 1994 budget revenue efficiently and equitashold therefme be to create bly, increasing the composition
stable andpredictable conditions of public expendihrre in profor the economy and the brsi- ductive areas, reducing relative expendiness commrmity to thrive. Tio
'his eDd, a transparently pru- tr.ues especially on subsidies ft at
dent budget consistent with the are not appropriately targeted,
inflation and exchange rate ob- and adequately fimding social
jectives is very vital.
welfare services like education
and health.

tively

6. Policy Recommendations

(i)

(iii) Recourse to deficit financing through the CBN

shorld be kept within the limit
statutorily provided in the I 99 I
CBN Decree, i.e., 12.5 per cent
of the estimated recurrent revenue budget ofthe Federal Govemment for 1994. Additional
public sector borrowing should
be directed to non-banking
sources at the prevailing market
interest rates. The size of such
address is therefore the restora- non-bank borrowing should not
tion of macro-economic stabil- be too large so as not to effecity. There is no gainsaying the tively crowd out the more profact that a prudent fiscal policy ductive private sector or to push
is the foundation of a stable the interest rates to levels that
rnacroeconomy. In this regard, make private sector investrnent
the burgeoning fiscal deficit unattactive.
could today, be regarded as
(iv) On the domestic debt isNigeria's economic mrnber one sue, all govemment exposureto
It[acro-economic stability is a prerequisite for sustainable economic grourth" It creates a hospitable climate for
private investnent both foreign
and domestic and makes it relatively easy for reform in the
financial sector to succeed. The
most important task now and
which the 1994 budget must
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the Central Bank at

a

given cut-

off date, say end of August,
1993, shor:ld be securitised
with interest below the market
rate. This will assist to ease the
br.nden of domestic deh service and will ceteris partbus,
help to reduce ttre hrdget deficit. All subsequent govemment rEcourse to the Central

Bank for accommodation
should be securitised and sold
to the public at market rates

within a given time frame of
say four weeks.
The CBN on its pan will
continue its policy of reducing
the liquidity over-hang in the
economy though a combination of existing instnrments
while veering increasingly te
wards greater use of indirect
monetary instnrments including Open Market Operations
(OMO), whose efficiency depends crucially onthe success
inreducing the budget deficit.
("D the financial sector,
we lmowthat strong and effective bank srpervision can play
a major role in the early detection of bank problems. In this
regard, and taking cognisance

(")

h

of the fact that fraud and or
conflict of interests are found
in most cases of known bank
failures the world over, the

CBN will not "let monkeys
look after bananas". It will, to
the extent possible, ensure that
banks' reporting system is able
to detect potential problem areas such as loan concentration,

courccted lending, high expe
surGs to marketrisks andnoncompliance with prudential

regulations. The CBN will
also endeavour to detect any
stnrctural flaws inthe existing
system with a view to effecting
remedial measures. Apart from
l"y*g downa sorurdand competitive framework for banks
to operate in, it is essential that

L sound and

stable

macroeconomic environment
is achieved and maintained.

Psaling with distness in the
banking sector without this
camot be expected to yield
any &rrable result.

(vii) In the external sector,
th min problem is that of
debt over-hand. Here, a crcdible programme that can enlist
the srpport ofthe imernational
fimncial commrmity, in particular the Wmld Bank and the

6

IMF, and through them the Paris
Club grorry of creditors will ne ed
to be put in place. With such
support, debt relief similar, if
not better, than the Trinidad and
Toronto temrs may be secured.
It may also lead to inflow of
fresh debt andnon-debt capital
inflows.
(viii) The current instability
in the exchange rate reflects the
rmderlying problem of the budget deficit and liquidity overh^r,g. An appnopriate resolution of this problem is therefore
necessary to evolve a realistic
and stable exchange rate of the
naira inthe context of reduci4g
the budget deficit. However,
the arnhorities have no intention
of dwaluing the naira exchange

rate. Instead the rnderlying
causes ofthe instability, should

be addressed appropriately. To
do otherwise will be to address

the symptoms rather ttran
the cause and experience has

shownttrat this willnot give
us a lasting and duable rezult.
(ix) At present, our ecG
nomic problem does not
appear to lie in the want of
appropriate policy formulation, but largely in our resolve to implement credible
measures consistently and
tenacionsly, having regard
of course, to the needs of the
poor and vulnerable goups
in the society. N{r. Ctrairman, this has been achieved
before, especially when
there was symmetry between monetary and fiscal
policies. It can be done
again if the will is there.

